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FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and 
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada 
corporation, : 
Defendants and : 
Appellees. : 
: Case No. 950481 
: Priority No. 15 
Assigned from Utah Supreme 
Court, Case No. 950132 
Appellant Gull Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter "Gull") hereby 
submits this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Appellees 
submitted by Floyd E. Weston dba Metabolic Research Institute and 
Formula Technology (hereinafter "Weston and Formula Technology"). 
I • ARGUMENT 
A. AN ATTORNEY CAN BIND HIS CLIENT TO AN ORAL SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Weston and Formula Technology have cited both Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-51-32 and the case of John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc.. 
876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), as limiting their attorney's 
power to bind them in a settlement agreement. Gull respectfully 
disagrees. 
1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2) states that an attorney and 
counselor has authority "to bind his client in any of the steps of 
an actionable proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or 
entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise." In the 
case at bar, Mr. Zoll bound his clients Weston and Formula 
Technology by making an oral stipulation which was entered upon the 
minutes of the court. Such oral stipulations made on the record 
are permitted under Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. Thus Mr. Zoll was acting completely within the 
parameters set by § 78-51-32 and cannot now claim that his actions 
had no binding effect on Weston and Formula Technology. 
Weston and Formula Technology misrepresent in their Brief what 
this Court has stated regarding Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 and an 
attorney's power to settle a matter on his client's behalf. They 
do this by citing only a portion of this Court's discussion on the 
subject. The following is the full quote from which Weston and 
Formula Technology cite only a portion: 
We do not believe, however, that § 78-51-32 
was intended to void oral settlement 
agreements. Clearly, the power to settle a 
lawsuit resides in the client. If a client 
authorizes the attorney to settle the matter 
and has expressed an intent to be bound by the 
attorney's acts, absent a statute of frauds 
issue, an oral or privately negotiated 
settlement agreement is as valid as a signed, 
written settlement agreement that has been 
written on the minutes of the court. 
2 
John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 886, n. 11 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
This Court has clearly stated the law in the State of Utah 
regarding settlements: an attorney can bind a client to a 
settlement agreement, and oral settlement agreements are as valid 
as signed, written agreements. For these reasons, Weston and 
Formula Technology must be held to the terms of the stipulation of 
settlement entered into by their authorized agent on their behalf. 
B. TEE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT OF A PRINCIPAL IS NOT GROUNDS TO 
SET ASIDE THE REINSTATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Weston and Formula Technology allege in their brief that Gull 
has failed to dispute the trial court's finding of excusable 
neglect on the part of Mr. Floyd Weston. The reason for this is 
simple. Floyd Weston was not the agent who bound Formula 
Technology and himself to the terms of the stipulation of 
settlement entered in open court. Mr. Ray Zoll was the agent 
acting on behalf of these two principals at that time. If there is 
excusable neglect which would justify the setting aside of the 
stipulation of settlement, that excusable neglect must be on the 
part of Mr. Zoll, the authorized agent, and not on the part of the 
principals, as claimed by Weston and Formula Technology. In this 
regard, Gull's attorney specifically asked the trial court whether 
it found any excusable neglect on the part of Mr. Zoll. The 
court's response was: "I'm not going to make a finding on that." 
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(R. at 834.) Instead, the court found excusable neglect only on 
the part of Mr. Weston. (R. at 833.) Herein lies the trial 
court's error. 
To claim that the stipulation of settlement should be set 
aside because of excusable neglect on the part of one of the 
principals disregards the very essence of principal-agent law, i.e. 
that a principal is bound by the acts of its authorized agent. 
Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Mr. Zoll, as an authorized agent, agreed to the stipulation of 
settlement on his client's behalf. If excusable neglect exists, it 
must be grounded in his behavior and not the principals' . This is 
particularly true since at no time have Weston and Formula 
Technology ever alleged that Mr. Zoll was not clothed with 
authority to settle the case. To the contrary, it is clear that 
Mr. Zoll had the full authority not only to represent Weston and 
Formula Technology in procedural matters, but also in this instance 
in discussing and agreeing to a settlement. That authority having 
been transferred to Mr. Zoll, Weston and Formula Technology are in 
no position to argue that their agent went beyond the scope of his 
authority, by settling on a basis different than their 
understanding of what the settlement would be. Under the 
circumstances of this case, there is no precedent in the State of 
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Utah which would permit the principals to be relieved of their 
obligations as agreed upon by their agent. 
C. THE DATE FOR PAYMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT MONIES WAS FIXED AND 
FIRM 
Weston and Formula Technology consistently refer to the date 
by which they obligated themselves to pay the settlement money as 
an arbitrary and flexible date. In so saying, they argue that 
there was no fixed time for payment but that the date established 
in the stipulation of settlement was merely a suggested time and 
that somehow it did not matter whether they made the payment by 
that time or by any other time. The mere recitation of this 
argument is sufficient to defeat it. 
A review of the transcript of the stipulation of settlement 
shows that Mr. Zoll agreed that the settlement payment would be 
made to Gull within ten days. (R. at 615.) When Mr. Zoll started 
to condition the commencement of the ten days upon the court's 
order being signed, the court immediately confirmed that it was a 
set date, ten days from the hearing date. Mr. Rust, Gull's 
counsel, affirmed his agreement with the court by stating, "I think 
we have an agreement here," meaning that the parties had agreed to 
a payment date ten days from the date of the hearing and not ten 
days from the date of the stipulation being signed by the judge. 
(R. at 615.) Mr. Zoll did not pursue any further his request that 
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the money should be paid ten days from the date a written 
stipulation was signed by the court. 
The date for payment was clarified even further when Mr. Rust 
pointed out that the payment date of October 1, 1994 fell on a 
Saturday. The court then stated that the date for payment should 
be moved to the following Monday, October 3rd. (R. at 616.) There 
was thus no guessing nor ambiguity regarding when the money was to 
be paid. It was specifically and unequivocally stated that the 
payment would be made by the date set or else the consequences of 
not paying would have to be met, namely that the full amount of the 
previously entered summary judgment would have to be paid. It is 
clear from the record that Mr. Zoll fully understood that the money 
had to be paid by October 3, 1994 at 5:00 p.m. or the prior 
judgment would be reinstated. There are no credible grounds for 
Weston and Formula Technology's claim that the payment date for the 
settlement money was arbitrary and that time was not of the essence 
under the stipulation. 
D. THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
Weston and Formula Technology's repeated reference to the 
confused procedural history of this case and the "confounded 
judicial proceedings" only serve as a smoke screen to the real 
issue of whether the stipulation of settlement was clear and 
unambiguous in its terms. Gull freely admits this case has had a 
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confused procedural history with several judges presiding over the 
case. However, the crux of this case involves but one hearing, 
i.e. the hearing when the stipulation of settlement was made. At 
that one hearing there was but one judge present together with 
representatives of both parties. The agreement reached at this 
hearing is clear and unambiguous in its terms, lacking any 
procedural confusion or confounded judicial proceedings. Weston 
and Formula Technology must not be allowed to escape the 
consequences of their breach of the stipulation of settlement by 
claiming confusion. 
There is also no basis for Weston and Formula Technology's 
claim that the stipulation of settlement was entered into 
inadvertently. A review of the stipulation demonstrates a clear 
understanding on Mr. Zoll's behalf that he was binding his clients. 
Finally, Weston and Formula Technology cannot claim that Gull 
is seeking a windfall based on a technicality by requesting that 
the summary judgment be reinstated. The trial court clearly states 
during the stipulation that, "in the event there is a default, then 
Mr. Rust can submit an affidavit that it wasn't paid; judgment may 
then enter as previously entered by Judge Moffat." Mr Zoll 
responds: "Yes. And Mr. Rust prepare the dismissal papers?" (R. 
at 616.) The parties mutually agreed to the penalty should Weston 
and Formula Technology breach the terms of the stipulation. 
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E. GULL HAS FULLY PRESERVED ALL ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL 
Weston and Formula Technology claim that the issue of whether 
Judge Hyde could vacate his previously entered order was not 
properly preserved at the trial level and cannot now be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Without citing any authority in support 
of their position, Weston and Formula Technology simply state that 
Gull did not "object" to Judge Hyde's order rescinding the 
reinstated summary judgment and therefore cannot argue against the 
rescission on appeal. Gull respectfully submits that there is no 
requirement that such an objection be made. The only objection 
that could have been made was a motion for reconsideration or an 
interlocutory appeal, neither of which courts view with favor. The 
preservation of the issue of whether Judge Hyde could have 
rescinded the judgment is that it was ruled upon and the time for 
appealing from the ruling did not commence until there was a final 
disposition of the entire case. There is no question that Gull has 
timely appealed from the final disposition of the case. Therefore, 
the issue has been properly preserved for appeal. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, Gull respectfully requests 
that both Judge Rigtrup's order of March 9, 1995 finding excusable 
neglect on the part of Mr. Weston and Judge Hyde's order of 
February 8, 1995 setting aside summary judgment against Weston and 
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Formula Technology be vacated, and that Judge Hyde's order of 
November 18, 1994 granting Gull's motion for reinstatement of 
summary judgment and the subsequent summary judgment dated December 
2, 1994 against Weston and Formula Technology and in favor of Gull 
in the amount of $38,842.74 plus interest be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this /( day of September, 1995. 
KESLER 8c RUST 
'£ph C/ Rust 
orneys for Appellant 
1 Laboratories, Inc. 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the following REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Case No. 950481, 
1/ * * 
postage prepaid, this // * day of September, 1995, to: 
B. Ray Zoll 
ZOLL Sc BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
SaLt Lake City, Utah 84123 
gull\repbrief.wes 
10 
